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Abstract 
 
  
In recent years there has been growing evidence of a reversal of earlier 
privatizations at the municipal level. We use data on over 800 cases of re-
municipalization worldwide to examine propositions drawn from theory on 
the choice between public versus private sector delivery and policy 
implementation. We find that sectors with strong network characteristics are 
associated with lower probabilities of implementation. Also, it takes longer to 
implement re-municipalization policies in network sectors. On the other 
hand, re-municipalization is more likely to be implemented and implemented 
faster in the case of personal services including health and education. The 
results do not find that greater clarity about re-municipalization policy is 
associated with the level of implementation. There is some support for the 
hypothesis that the quality of government is positively associated with the 
probability of implementing policy but not the time taken to complete the 
task. However, other institutional factors such as legal traditions are found to 
be significant determinants of policy implementation and its finalization. The 
great recession was found to have increased the probability of implementing 
reforms and there is some evidence of faster implementation in the post-
recession period. However, we fail to find evidence that policy 
implementation is more efficient over time and policy learning in this regard 
is not evident. 
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Introduction  
In recent years there has been growing evidence of a reversal of the widespread trend towards 
privatization that took hold in the late 1980s and 1990s. Reverse privatization and nationalization 
has occurred at the level of state-owned enterprises (SOEs), municipal enterprises and local 
government (sometimes municipal) services. At the level of SOEs the global financial crisis and 
subsequent great recession led to significant levels of nationalization especially in the financial 
sector. Voszka (2017) estimated that between 2007 and 2009 the value of nationalization was in 
the range of $230-$325 billion and that the nationalization of assets and companies gained 
momentum after the crisis. Various methods have been used to implement these changes 
including the re-purchase of privatized assets (e.g. the energy system in Lithuania) as well as 
increasing state ownership by ‘silent methods’ including increased public stakes in partly 
privatized companies (e.g. France and Germany)  
At the local level evidence has gradually emerged of numerous cases of reverse privatizations 
where local services are returned to public production thereby ending privatization arrangements 
such as contracting out, concessions and public-private partnerships (PPPs). Such reversals of 
earlier privatization measures are commonly referred to as ‘re-municipalization’ and include high-
profile cases such as Atlanta and Paris where concessions for water supply were terminated in 
2003 and 2010 respectively. In addition, there have been several cases of municipalization where 
local governments establish new municipal companies in liberalized markets. For example, in the 
German energy sector, 63 new stadtwerke (local public utilities) were established between 2007 
and 2012 (Hall, 2012).1  
Recent data provided by Kishimoto and Petitjean (2017) provides evidence of over 800 cases in 
over 40 countries where it was decided to return services to municipal control since the early 
2000’s. That data shows that the decision to re-municipalize may or may not be implemented. 
Moreover, where decisions are implemented there is significant variation in the period between 
the decision and implementation across cases. The time taken to implement re-municipalization 
decisions can have important implications for public policy as protracted durations are suggestive 
of obstacles to the achievement of policy objectives. In economic terms, guiding decisions 
through the implementation process is likely to create non-trivial transaction costs and 
consequent efficiency losses.  
                                                          
1 This was a noteworthy development as Germany and Frances were European pioneers in terms of 
encouraging private management of the electricity sector (Battaglio and Legge, 2009, p. 700). 
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In this paper we use the data provided by Kishimoto and Petitjean (2017) to empirically examine 
two key questions concerning the re-municipalization phenomenon. First, we examine the 
factors that explain whether re-municipalization was effectively (fully) implemented, or not. 
Second, we also examine the lag between the decision to re-municipalize and full completion of 
the re-municipalization process. As this decision involves, in most cases, the reversal of an earlier 
decision to privatize it is likely to result in subsequent negotiation around issues such as 
contracts, property rights and organizational change, which can influence the duration of the 
implementation period.  
Whether the practical implementation of the decision is relatively straightforward or protracted is 
an issue that has received little attention in the literature. We are not aware of other studies that 
deal with the implementation of re-municipalization decisions. We address the issue by utilizing 
the data to explore the factors that determine the effective implementation, and the duration of 
implementation when it happened. 
Our paper makes two significant contributions to the existing literature. On one hand, it 
provides new analysis and insights on the effectiveness of re-municipalization, which is still an 
under-researched topic. On the other, it provides new, robust empirical evidence on the issue of 
policy implementation and the factors that explain delays between deciding and finalizing public 
policy reform. Our analysis utilizes a novel international data set, which provides the opportunity 
to adopt an empirical approach that sheds light on differences between countries in terms of the 
implementation of policies that are bringing about significant changes in the ownership and 
production of public services worldwide. 
 
Related Literature  
Our analysis builds on two different strands of the literature: (1) public versus private choice for 
public service delivery and (2) policy implementation. The following sections discusses how we 
use these strands to frame our analysis. 
Public versus private choice for delivery of public services 
The literature on factors explaining privatization and its effects has grown extensively since the 
early 1980s as more robust theoretical and empirical approaches were used to analyze 
privatization. Seminal works by Donahue (1989) and later studies by Brown and Potoski (2003, 
2004), Hefetz and Warner (2012) and Levis and Tadelis (2010) have shown that privatization will 
be more likely if transaction costs are low and if quality is measurable and not crucial for policy 
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makers. While fiscal constraints and partisan political interests are drivers of privatization, 
ideology tends not to be a key factor for technical public services -such as waste collection, 
wastewater, etc. (Bel and Fageda, 2007, 2009, 2017). However, ideology is found to be more 
relevant for social services more closely related to welfare mechanisms -such as education, elder 
care and child care (i.e. Elinder and Jordahl, 2013; Petersen, Houlberg and Christenssen, 2015; 
Guo and Willner, 2017).2 
Our analysis of drivers of re-municipalization draws from the existing literature on privatization 
but robust multivariate studies in this literature are still scarce. Preliminary multiservice studies 
for the US find reverse privatization to be a pragmatic decision (Hefetz and Warner, 2004, 2007, 
2012) with politics or ideology having little influence (Warner and Aldag, forthcoming). Several 
studies based on European countries have been published in recent years. In the water sector, 
Chong, Saussier and Silverman (2015) find that prices tend to be higher under private 
management and this can explain re-municipalization in large municipalities with overpriced 
services, while ideology does not appear to be relevant. Campos-Alba et al (2017) analyze several 
local services in Spain. They find that technical services are less frequently re-municipalized 
compared to personal/social services, and also that re-municipalization decisions do not appear 
to be ideologically driven. However, Gradus and Budding (forthcoming) study re-
municipalization of solid waste collection in the Netherlands and find that ideological factors 
have some albeit limited influence. 
Other literature covering public and private choices for service delivery has analyzed the delays 
in the tendering processes in public-private partnerships (PPPs). Complex procurement models 
such as PPP are characterized by lengthy tendering periods that can impact public sector 
investment efficiency and impose higher social costs on citizens (HM Treasury, 2010, KPMG, 
2010; CCPPP, 2015). Reeves et al. (2015, 2017) used duration analysis to examine the extent to 
which PPP tendering periods in Ireland and the United Kingdom are explained by factors such 
as project size (i.e. capital value), project sector, procurement authority, and the timing of 
contract notice. They found that Irish tendering periods have decreased over time but were not 
significantly associated with project capital value (Reeves et al., 2015). UK evidence suggests 
substantial sectoral variation, and projects with higher capital values, as well as those overlapping 
with general elections, were also associated with significantly longer tendering periods, after 
controlling for other factors (Reeves et al., 2017). Further evidence on Canada (Casady et al, 
                                                          
2 This is consistent with data in Battaglio (2009) showing that by mid 1990s privatization enjoyed stronger 
opposition in personal-services sectors such as hospitals, than in technical services such as electricity. 
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forthcoming) find that tendering periods in Canadian PPPs are slower when risk transfer is 
important, and faster with administrative efficiency. 
These studies show that the lag between deciding and implementing new forms of public service 
(or asset) production or delivery can vary across jurisdictions and can depend on institutional 
arrangements, legal frameworks, political commitments, and financial factors. Such issues have 
not been examined in the context of re-municipalization. This gap in the literature is addressed in 
this paper. Based on the existing theory and evidence on public versus private choice of public 
service delivery, we formulate the two following hypotheses. 
H1: Effective implementation and speed of re-municipalization is negatively related to technical 
services characterized by greater asset specificity and higher transaction costs. 
H2: Effective implementation and speed of re-municipalization is higher in social/personal than 
in technical services, as ideological factors can be more influential and give more strength to the 
policy. 
 
Public policy implementation. 
Implementation is an important part of the policy process (Lane, 1987, Winter 2006). Research 
on the implementation of public policies gained momentum after the seminal work by Pressman 
and Wildasvky (1973) which was based on cases of implementation failures and was soon 
followed by increasing emphasis on the need for more theory-building (Van Meter and Van 
Horn, 1975). Subsequent studies such as those by Sabatier and Mazmadian (1979, 1980) in the 
US and Hogwood and Gunn (1984) in the UK laid the theoretical foundations for the top-down 
approach to analyzing public policy implementation. This approach focuses on upper-level 
policy making and an influential articulation of its main characteristics can be found in O’Toole 
(1986). However, other scholars (Elmore 1979; Lipsky, 1980; Hull and Hern, 1987) challenged 
the up-down approach and suggested a bottom-up approach, which places a special focus on 
street-level bureaucracy for the analysis of implementation of public policies. 
More recent research on policy implementation has sought to overcome the contradictory duality 
between the top-down and bottom-up approaches. Particularly influential in that regard has been 
the work by Winter (2006) which calls for de-emphasizing the analysis of goal achievement and 
outcomes, more related to policy evaluation, and instead places a stronger focus on the analysis 
of implementation outputs; that is whether the policy has been effectively implemented, and the 
variation in outputs. In this way, the de-limitation of implementation outputs follows Montjoy 
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and O’Toole’s (1979) distinction between implementation as decisions made in carrying out a 
policy, and impact as the effect on the ultimate target. It also followed O'Toole's (2000) later 
position that implementation refers to the completion of actions needed to carry out a policy, 
that is, before efforts to evaluate it impacts and social effects -implementation outcomes- (Hill 
and Hupe 2014; Sætren and Hupe, 2018). In this way, the precursory suggestion by Lane (1983, 
1987) that the real issue was not to evaluate if implementation was successful (outcomes), but 
rather if it was effective, has gained much ground.  
Following that path, Winter (2006:156) suggests an Integrated Implementation Model, which, 
rather than a causal model, is a framework of analysis that presents crucial factors affecting 
outputs and permits specification of hypotheses that can be empirically tested. Emphasis on 
outputs as dependent variables as suggested by Winter helps to connect implementation analysis 
with empirical research (Hupe, Hill and Nangia, 2014). 
Promoting further (and more robust) empirical analysis of policy implementation has been a 
widespread recommendation in the literature, based on early studies by Goggin (1986, 1987), and 
Goggin et al (1990). Recent studies (e.g. Hupe and Sætren, 2015: 94-95; Sætren, 2014:86) have 
identified a number of desirable features of empirical research, specifically: 1) Clearly defined 
variables (dependent as well as independent); 2) Theoretically derived hypotheses; 3) Use of 
statistical analysis with quantitative data; 4) More comparison across policy sectors and units of 
analysis and; 5) Longitudinal research. Furthermore, Hupe and Sætren (2015: 96) add that cross-
national comparison is especially important to furthering the development of theory in 
implementation research.  
These are precisely the features of the empirical exercise we undertake for this paper, in which 
we consider the effective implementation of government control of service delivery as the policy 
output and delays in implementing the policy as the variation in policy outputs. Importantly, 
policy outcomes are not considered as this is beyond the scope of this study. Also, as sufficient 
data (beyond case studies) is not available we do not evaluate re-municipalization.  
Several factors covered in our study are identified in policy implementation research. First, clarity 
with respect to what needs to be implemented will reduce the variation in interpretation 
(Matland, 1995), because task ambiguity is negatively related to implementation performance 
(Montjoy & O’Toole, 1979; Sabatier and Mazmanian, 1979; Mazmanian and Sabatier, 1983; 
Matland, 1995). Evidence in this regard has been provided by Meier and McFarlane (1995), 
Keiser and Meier (1996), Chun and Rainey (2005a, 2005b) and Vancoppenolle, Saetre and Hupe 
(2015). Another relevant factor affecting implementation performance is the quality and 
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effectiveness of government (Matland, 1995; Bozeman, 2013). In that regard, administrative 
efficiency will enhance implementation performance whereas procedural complexity will have 
the opposite effect (Meier and O’Toole, 2009; König and Luetgert, 2009; Toshkow 2010).  
Changing economic conditions and external shocks are another factor that can influence 
implementation performance (Sabatier and Mazmanian, 1979; Matland, 1995). Our research 
focuses on the impact of the great recession, which in general, raised skepticism about the role of 
the private sector in the economy and increased the demand for government intervention 
(Engelen et al. 2011; Grugel and Riggirozzi, 2102; Hodges and Lapsley, 2016; Levy, 2017).We 
therefore examine how the great recession influenced policy implementation performance in the 
context of re-municipalization. Finally, another time-related factor is that of policy learning, 
which can contribute to improve the performance of policy implementation (Sabatier, 1986; 
McLaughlin, 1987; May, 1992; Sabatier and Jenkins, 1993; Matland, 1995; Moyson, Scholten and 
Weible, 2017). 
Based on the existing theory and evidence on policy implementation, we formulate the four 
following hypotheses. 
H3: Ambiguous definition of policy goals and tasks has a negative effect on the probability of 
the policy being effectively implemented, and also on the time required for implementation.  
H4: Government effectiveness is positively related to the probability of the policy being 
effectively implemented, and also to the speed of implementation. 
H5: Re-municipalization decided after the beginning of the great recession has a higher 
probability of being effectively and quickly implemented. 
H6: The probability of effective implementation and speedy implementation will increase over 
time due to policy learning. 
 
Empirical Approach 
Data  
The lack of a reliable database on re-municipalization has been addressed in two recent 
publications by a coalition of trade unions and other organizations (Kishimoto et al., 2015; 
Kishimoto and Petitjean, 2017).3 Our empirical analysis draws on the dataset assembled by 
                                                          
3 These publications are made available online by the Transnational Institute (www.tni.org) which 
describes itself as an “international research and advocacy institute committed to building a just, 
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Kishimoto and Petitjean (2017), which covers information on 834 cases of re-municipalization 
worldwide since year 2000. The authors collect data on the country/region/city where it 
happened, the population affected (inhabitants), the specific service and sector where the re-
municipalization was decided, the government level of taking back control (state/province/city) 
and the private company related to the re-municipalization. Also, there is information on how it 
occurred (e.g. contract expired, contract was terminated, shares were sold by private operators). 
In order to establish our main hypotheses, we take particular advantage of the information 
provided on the timing of re-municipalization. Kishimoto and Petitjean (2017) distinguish 
between the date of the decision to re-municipalize and the date re-municipalization was actually 
implemented. This facilitates the determination of the time lapse between decisions and 
implementations. Furthermore, it allows us to identify those decisions that are yet to be 
implemented.  
Although the dataset includes re-municipalizations in 44 countries, figure 1 shows that the 
aggregate incidence of re-municipalization is dominated by a few countries, namely, Germany 
(346), France (152), United States (67) United Kingdom (64) and Spain (56). In sectoral terms, 
energy (346), water (269) and other local government services (140) rank the highest. 
The data shows that in the majority (68 per cent) of cases, re-municipalization occurred 
following the decision not to renew contracts after they expired.4 Waiting for existing contracts 
to expire before (re)municipalizing is to be expected given the high level of costs likely to be 
incurred if contracts are terminated. Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that contract terminations did 
occur in 132 (21 per cent) of cases for which data are available with two thirds of terminations 
occurring in the water services sector. In the remainder of cases (re)municipalization occurred 
after private companies sold their shares or took the decision to withdraw from contracts. The 
data also includes a further category labelled de-privatizations. These are defined as decisions to 
re-municipalize that were taken without a clear indication on how and when this should be 
executed and they account for 34 cases in the database.  
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
democratic and sustainable planet”. In this dataset, municipalization also includes where governments 
create a new public service to meet citizen’s needs. 
4 The German energy sector accounts for over 64 per cent of cases where re-municipalization occurred after 
contracts expired. 
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Figure 1. Frequency of remunicipalizations by country (2000-2017). 
 
Figure 2. Frequency of remunicipalizations by sector (2000-2017). 
 
Another interesting feature of our data is the information on the timing of re-municipalizations. 
Figure 3, which covers all cases between 2000 and the last complete year (2016) in the database, 
shows that over time, the incidence of decisions to re-municipalize followed an increasing trend. 
It also shows an important structural change between years 2007 and 2009, which coincides with 
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the first years of the great recession. The number of decisions prior to 2008 was just 141 (20% of 
sample), whereas this increased to 566 (80% of sample) between 2009 and 2016.  
Importantly, the data shows that just 54% of decisions were actually implemented over the 
period 2000-2017. The percentage of decisions implemented before 2009 was very low (31%) 
but this increased significantly thereafter reaching an average of 59% between 2009 and 2017. 
Focusing on cases where decisions were implemented, the data shows that for the full sample, 
the average time period between making the decision to implementation e was 1.25 years. Figure 
4 shows that while the delays in most cases were concentrated in the two years after the decision 
several cases experienced significant delays, the maximum of which was 8 years. The average 
delay does not show any significant change between the pre- and post-great recession.  
Figure 3. Time trends of decisions to Re-municipalize.  
 
Figure 4. Distribution of implemented re-municipalizations by years of delay since decision.  
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In order to further examine implementation rates and their delay we provide some descriptive 
statistics in table 1, which displays rates and delays by economic sector and by the channels 
through which the re-municipalization was decided. The first three columns focus on the 
economic sectors, showing that the highest percentage of implemented decisions is found in the 
energy sector (89%). This is followed by personal oriented services, such as health and education 
(76% and 64%, respectively). Transportation, waste and other local government services, which 
may involve technical but also personal services, are the next group (55%, 46% and 45%, 
respectively).5 Water, which is generally consider a technical infrastructure-based service presents 
by far the lowest implementation rate. Regarding delays, we find that the lowest delays are 
associated with personal services, such as health (0.52 years) and education (0.75 years), followed 
by other local government services (0.70 years). More technical services seem to take longer to 
implement with energy (1.57 years), transportation (1.26 years) and water (1.14 years) showing 
the longest delays.  
This analysis can also be replicated focusing on the channel of re-municipalization presented in 
the last three columns. Public-led decisions enjoy a low implementation rate of 46% and an 
average delay of 1.28 years. Instead, private-led reasons (namely, the private sector selling shares 
or withdrawing from the service) show a much higher implementation rate (68%) and a much 
shorter average delay (0.48 years).  
 
                                                          
5 Other local government services include a miscellanea of activities such as parking, sports, cleaning, security, bike 
rental, maintenance of public space, housing, funeral services, parks and gardens, municipal crane, sidewalk, contact 
centers, police station, cinema, school catering, IT services, support services, and human resources. 
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Table 1. Average rates of implementation and delays  
Sector Implemented Delay How Implemented Delay 
Education 64% 0.75 Public-led 48% 1.28 
Health 76% 0.52 De-privatization 50% 1.66 
Waste 46% 0.93 Expired 53% 1.38 
Transportation 55% 1.26 Terminated 28% 0.52 
Energy 89% 1.57    
Water 17% 1.14 Private-led 68% 0.48 
Other services 45% 0.70    
 
Methods and variables 
The empirical approach in this study comprises two different analyses of the implementation of 
re-municipalization decisions. On the one hand, given the low implementation rate of re-
municipalization decisions, we are interested in assessing the factors that determine the 
probability of implementation. Thus, we consider all decisions in the database and identify 
whether they have been actually implemented or not. Our dependent variable for this analysis is 
a binary variable (Implemented) which is assigned a value of 1 if decisions are actually implemented 
and with 0 for those not implemented yet. Because our analysis is based on a probability model 
with a binary outcome variable, we apply logistic regressions with robust to heteroskedasticity 
errors, or clustered errors either by country or by economic sector. We transform coefficients 
into odds ratios (OR) in order to facilitate their interpretation.  
On the other hand, we are also interested in evaluating the variables that extend or shorten the 
delay between the re-municipalization decision and its implementation. This analysis is applied 
only to the sample of the database in which decisions have been implemented, leaving aside 
those decisions not implemented. Because our dependent variable follows a distribution similar 
to count data – (see figure 4) – for which the normality assumption of OLS is not reasonable, we 
apply negative binomial regressions, for which we also correct errors by clustering them either at 
country level or by economic sector.  
Both approaches use a common set of explanatory variables. First, we use demographic variables 
such as population (in thousands) and its square, to account for the size effects. The square is 
introduced in the equation on the probability of implementation in order to capture possible 
non-linearities between the likelihood of implementation and the size of the jurisdiction when 
this offers a better fit than including population alone. The variable Local is also a binary variable 
that takes a value of 1 if the government involved in the decision is a local government, and 0 if 
it is a supra-municipal government.  
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An important source of variation is the economic sector in which the re-municipalized service 
belongs. As mentioned above, economic sectors are characterized by different levels of 
transaction costs that the literature establishes as an important factor in public service reform. As 
the energy sector has the highest frequency in our data base with more than 300 cases, we use 
this sector as a reference category when we include all binary variables denoting economic sector. 
Coefficients are therefore interpreted with reference to the energy sector. However, as we are 
testing two hypotheses derived from the private-public literature and comparisons it is necessary 
to go beyond testing with respect to just one sector. To address this when testing H1 we 
introduce a binary variable denoting economic sectors characterized by network features (high 
transaction costs). Secondly, to test H2 we introduce a binary variable denoting personal services 
with 1, and 0 otherwise. Most personal services belong to two sectors: education and health. 
However, we revised the category ‘other local government sectors’ to add services such as school 
catering, local food supply, homelessness and housing advice to personal services (vs. technical 
services). 
The origin of the decision is captured in our specification by incorporating a binary variable 
assigned a value of 1 if the decision is privately led. This covers cases in which the private sector 
sold shares or withdrew from the service. This should be interpreted relative to publicly-led 
decisions including de-privatizations and contracts that expired and were terminated. Privately-
led decisions are beyond the boundaries of the public sector decision process but require a public 
sector response in order to guarantee the delivery of the service. We expect this variable to affect 
re-municipalization implementation rates and their time efficiency. Furthermore, we test H3 by 
including a dummy variable denoting a specific group of publicly-led decisions, namely de-
privatizations. These decisions are less defined than the all other approaches (terminations, 
contract expired and private withdrawal). This overarching term includes those cases where the 
decision to move to public service delivery was made, but no specific action or method was 
chosen. This connects to the issue of goal and task ambiguity discussed in our theoretical 
framework that allowed us to establish our third hypothesis (H3). 
We also use country-specific dummy variables to distinguish the observations of the most 
frequent countries in the dataset: Germany, France, United States and United Kingdom. This 
may offer insights into the average behavior of decisions in these countries relative to all other 
countries. We explore inter-country differences further by including several institutional variables 
at country level in order to test H4. The first of these variables is a proxy for government 
effectiveness, obtained from the database of the Quality of Government Institute (University of 
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Gothenburg). The second is a variable indicating the country-specific regulatory burden (from 
several editions of the Annual Global Competitiveness Report published by the World 
Economic Forum). We expect opposite outcomes from these two variables. Government 
effectiveness should be expected to increase implementation rates and reduce the time lapse 
between decisions and implementations. However, regulatory burden should be expected to 
hinder both the implementation of decisions and the time efficiency in executing them. The 
other institutional binary variables included indicate the legal origin of the country’s 
administration. We use the classification by La Porta, López de Silanes and Shleifer (2008) to 
distinguish the German, British, French and Scandinavian legal origins of the countries included 
in our dataset.6  
Finally, the effects of time are captured by two different strategies. First, we introduce a binary 
variable that distinguishes the period before the great recession (until 2007) and the period after 
the great recession (from 2008) to test H5. After this approach we substitute the binary variable 
by specific year dummies for each year, which is a preferred strategy as it enables us to account 
for trend effects and year-specific shocks. This last strategy also allows us to evaluate H6, as it is 
expected to capture the learning process over time. Table 2 displays the descriptive statistics of 
the variables employed.  
Table 2. Descriptive statistics of variables employed. 
Variable Mean Std dev. Min Max 
Implemented 0.55 0.50 0 1 
Delay 1.26 1.32 0 8 
Population 580.30 120.94 0.269 72,147 
Local 0.60 0.49 0 1 
Energy 0.33 0.47 0 1 
Education 0.01 0.11 0 1 
Health 0.04 0.20 0 1 
Transportation 0.04 0.20 0 1 
Waste 0.04 0.20 0 1 
Water 0.28 0.45 0 1 
Other  0.15 0.36 0 1 
Privately_led 0.05 0.22 0 1 
Recession 0.88 0.33 0 1 
Network 0.61 0.49 0 1 
Personal 0.08 0.27 0 1 
Gov_effective 1.59 0.67 -1 2 
Regulation -3.21 0.48 -5 -1.9 
German_legor 0.45 0.49 0 1 
French_legor 0.31 0.46 0 1 
British_legor 0.20 0.40 0 1 
Scandiv_legor 0.05 0.21 0 1 
                                                          
6 Note we do not have countries with socialist legal origins in our sample. 
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Results 
Probability of Implementing Re-municipalization Decisions 
Table 3 displays our main results on the probability of implementation. Model (1) includes the 
basic specification with dummies for all economic sectors and for the countries with the highest 
incidence of decisions to re-municipalize (Germany, France, United States and United 
Kingdom). We also control for the structural change created by the great recession with the 
binary variable ‘post-great recession’. In model (2) we replace binary variables for economic 
sectors with the network variable in order to test the transaction cost hypothesis H1. A similar 
approach is followed in Model (3) where we test for personal services (instead of network-based 
services) related to H2.7 Model (4) adds the variable de-privatization in order to test H3 
(concerning ambiguity of policy goals). For the purpose of testing H4 regarding government 
effectiveness, we replace country-dummies with the institutional variables (namely, 
Gov_effective, Regulation, and the different legal origins) in Model (5). We use Model (6) to test 
the learning over time hypothesis, H6, by replacing the variable capturing the structural change 
produced by the great recession with year-specific binary variables. Three additional models were 
run to improve the robustness of the analysis. Models (7) and (8), retain the year-specific time 
effects and present results with clustered errors by country and by economic sector respectively. 
Finally, we present results for a restricted sample Model (9) in which we include only re-
municipalization decisions taken up to and including 2013.  
Our results provide some evidence of an inverted U-shape relationship between the likelihood of 
implementation and population size. It should be noted that our results show odds ratios instead 
of coefficients, so values below 1 indicate a lower probability and values over 1 a higher 
probability. In most models the probability increases with population until a certain threshold 
after which the probability starts to decrease in very large jurisdictions. This result is consistent 
for the most robust and preferred models (6-9) (which include year-specific fixed effects, 
institutional variables and clustered errors). It reveals a characteristic that re-municipalizations 
share with privatization reforms but the magnitude of the effect of a one thousand population 
change is not appreciable (odds ratios very close to 1). Whether the reforming government is 
local or supra-municipal and whether the decision is privately or publicly led, does not seem to 
affect the probability of implementation of a re-municipalization decision. 
                                                          
7
 Note these two binary variables are not included together in order to avoid collinearity. 
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Focusing on economic sectors, we find, in model 1, that compared to the energy sector (our 
reference category) the probability of implementation in the water sector – the second most 
frequent sector in the dataset is negative and statistically significant. Also, waste services and 
‘other government services’ display statistically significant coefficients below 1, indicating that 
the likelihood of implementing a re-municipalization decision in these sectors is statistically 
different and lower than in the energy sector. Transportation services and personally-oriented 
sectors, such as education and health, do not show significant differences compared to energy. 
However, in order to relate these findings to theoretical propositions we explore further by 
replacing sector-specific binary variables with two different groupings of sectors. First, in Model 
(2) we distinguish between sectors on the basis of network characteristics in order to proxy for 
transaction costs and test H1. Second, in Model (3) we distinguish personal services - from 
technical services - to test H2. Our results support both hypotheses. Sectors with network 
characteristics are associated with lower probabilities of implementation – about half of the 
likelihood (odds ratio of 0.50), while personal services are associated with higher probabilities – 
more than three times higher than technical services (odds ratio of 3.4). These results are 
consistent across all models.  
As the models that keep the distinction between personal versus technical services provide a 
(marginally) better fit compared to other models we keep this distinction to test our remaining 
hypotheses. In Model (4) we include a binary variable denoting de-privatizations in order to test 
H3. This variable refers to public-led re-municipalization decisions that are more task-ambiguous 
compared to other publicly-led decisions. Using publicly-led decisions (linked to contract 
expiration and termination) as a reference category our results indicate that de-privatizations are 
not statistically different from the rest of publicly-led decisions. We therefore fail to accept H3 
which states that ambiguity about the re-municipalization policy had a negative impact on the 
probability of implementation. This result holds when we include this variable in the more 
robust Models (5-9). 
Country dummies in models (1-4) also offer some anecdotal information regarding country-
specific implementation rates. Using ‘all other’ countries as the reference category the results 
from Models (1-4) indicate that Germany is the country associated with the highest probabilities 
of implementation – about 6 or 7 times. France, the UK and the US are associated with lower 
implementation rates compared to ‘other countries’.  
Next, to better understand the differences we find between countries, we substitute country 
dummies with institutional variables in Models (5-9). According to our results, government 
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effectiveness is only relevant and positively related to the implementation probability in Model 5 
as the odds ratio is not statistically significant when we add time dummies (Models 6-9). A 
similar pattern is found for the regulatory burden of the country although the direction of the 
relationship is negative in Model 5. Overall, we find only weak support for H4 in relation to 
government effectiveness and regulatory burden as our preferred and most robust models do not 
confirm the hypothesis. 
However, legal origins consistently report statistically significant coefficients for some specific 
legal heritages in all models. Using the German legal origin as the reference category, we find that 
the British, French and Scandinavian legal origins are associated with much lower 
implementation probabilities thereby confirming the traditional view of the effectiveness of the 
German administration. 
 
 
 
Table 3. Logistic regression estimates on probability of implementation (Coefficients 
transformed to Odds Ratios).  
 Logit 
Full 
Sample 
(1) 
Logit 
Full 
Sample 
(2) 
Logit 
Full 
Sample 
(3) 
Logit 
Full 
Sample 
(4) 
Logit 
Full 
Sample 
(5) 
Logit 
Full 
Sample 
 (6) 
Logit 
Full 
Sample 
 (7) 
Logit 
Full 
Sample 
 (8) 
Logit 
Restricted 
Sample 
 (9) 
 Population 1.000 
(0.0000) 
1.000 
(0.0000) 
1.000 
(0.0000) 
1.000 
(0.0000) 
1.000* 
(0.0000) 
1.000* 
(0.0000) 
1.000** 
(0.000) 
1.000* 
(0.0001) 
1.000** 
(0.0001) 
Population^2 0.999** 
(2.51e-09) 
0.999 
(0.0000) 
0.999* 
(2.95e-09) 
0.999* 
(2.97e-09) 
0.999* 
(2.54e-0) 
0.999* 
(2.87e-09) 
0.999* 
(3.01e-09) 
0.999* 
(3.18e-09) 
0.999*** 
(9.48e-10) 
Local 
administration  
1.081 
(0.2403) 
0.8202 
(0.1708) 
0.7764 
(0.1634) 
0.7765 
(0.1625) 
0.9144 
(0.1788) 
0.9722 
(0.2055) 
0.9722 
(0.3190) 
0.9722 
(0.3360) 
0.8629 
(0.4152) 
Private_led 1.782 
(0.8010) 
1.379 
(0.6161) 
1.391 
(0.6338) 
1.351 
(0.6170) 
1.356 
(0.7148) 
1.279 
(0.6846) 
1.279 
(0.3762) 
1.279 
(0.3611) 
1.513 
(1.185) 
Deprivatisation 
 
- - - 0.6059 
(0.3038) 
- - - - - 
Sector (vs. 
Energy) 
         
Education 0.5821 
(0.3932) 
- - - - - - - - 
Health 0.9040 
(0.5173) 
- - - - - - - - 
Other services 0.2646*** 
(0.0895) 
- - - - - - - - 
Transportation 0.5887 
(0.3002) 
- - - - - - - - 
Waste 0.2206*** 
(0.0973) 
- - - - - - - - 
Water 0.0779*** 
(0.0268) 
- - - - - - - - 
Service 
characteristics 
         
Network (vs no 
network) 
- 0.4967*** 
(0.1199) 
- - - - - - - 
Personal (vs 
technical) 
- - 3.405*** 
(0.9950) 
3.346*** 
(0.9809) 
2.516*** 
(0.8106) 
2.982*** 
(1.086) 
2.982*** 
(0.8736) 
2.982*** 
(0.9765) 
3.229** 
(1.847) 
Post great 
recession 
2.237 
(0.5832) 
3.267*** 
(0.8746) 
3.231*** 
(0.8296) 
3.345*** 
(0.8649) 
3.027*** 
(0.7385) 
- - - - 
Frequent 
Countries  
         
Germany 2.311*** 7.681*** 7.019*** 6.800*** - - - - - 
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(0.7195) (2.100) (1.745) (1.704) 
France 0.4338*** 
(0.1279) 
0.3026*** 
(0.0824) 
0.2797*** 
(0.0745) 
0.2694*** 
(0.0736) 
- - - - - 
UK 0.1507*** 
(0.0524) 
0.1653*** 
(0.0661) 
0.1940*** 
(0.0723) 
0.1842*** 
(0.0693) 
- - - - - 
United States 0.1710*** 
(0.0787) 
0.1505*** 
(0.0728) 
0.1303*** 
(0.0610) 
0.1251*** 
(0.0589) 
- - - - - 
Institutional 
variables 
         
Gov_effective - - - - 1.504* 
(0.3238) 
1.330 
(0.3844) 
1.330 
(0.4935) 
1.330 
(0.2560) 
1.550 
(0.4458) 
Regulation - - - - 0.4440*** 
(0.1350) 
1.692 
(0.7598) 
1.692 
(0.9913) 
1.692 
(0.0122) 
0.9315 
(0.6923) 
Legor_uk - - - - 0.0221*** 
(0.0066) 
0.0254*** 
(0.0082) 
0.0254*** 
(0.0069) 
0.0254*** 
(0.0334) 
0.0138*** 
(0.0082) 
Legor_fra - - - - 0.1255*** 0.0435*** 
(0.0251) 
0.0435*** 
(0.0348) 
0.0435*** 
(0.0435) 
0.0410*** 
(0.0409) 
Legor_sc - - - - 0.1428*** 
(0.0790) 
0.1874*** 
(0.1164) 
0.1874 
(0.2213) 
0.1874*** 
(0.0664) 
0.3082** 
(0.1453) 
Year Dummies No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Clustered errors 
(by country) 
No No No No No No 
 
Yes No No 
Clustered errors 
(by sector) 
No No No No No No No Yes Yes 
N. observations 825 825 825 825 818 696 696 696 484 
Pseudo R2 0.38 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.36 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.46 
Wald Chi2 281.12*** 227.53*** 233.78*** 233.62*** 250.69*** 229.91*** 229.91*** 229.91*** - 
Log-likelihood -350.28 -387.96 -384.44 -383.74 -359.26 -316.98 -316.98 -316.98 -180.80 
Notes: Significance levels 1%, 5% and 10% denoted by ***, ** and *, respectively. In parentheses standard errors, 
which are robust to heteroscedasticity in Models 1-6. Parentheses in Models 7-9 display standard errors clustered by 
country or by economic sector.  
 
Time differences are found to be associated with implementation probability. Our dummy 
variable ‘post-great recession’ records a positive and statistically significant coefficient in the 
models in which it is employed (1-5)- as odds ratios (OR) are greater than 1. This indicates that 
the probability of implementation increased by approximately 3-fold after 2008. – OR (3.3)- 
compared to the previous period, thereby confirming H5. The analysis therefore indicates that 
there were more re-municipalizations in the ‘post-great recession’ period and that their 
implementation rates increased. Models (6-9) in which this variable is replaced with year-specific 
dummies also indicate a similar path. All coefficients are negative and statistically significant 
when compared with the reference category (base year 2000). Also, odds ratios increase over 
time indicating that the probability of implementation is higher in later years. This increase in the 
implementation rate over time leads us to accept the ‘learning over time’ hypothesis H6.  
Finally, in model (9) we restrict the analysis to decisions taken before 2013.This robustness check 
allows us to exclude recent decisions that may not have had enough time to be executed, thereby 
biasing our results. Although this robustness check is made at the expense of a large number of 
observations, we expect more accurate estimates by removing possible noise arising from more 
recent decisions. As our main results hold after this robustness check we use the most robust 
combination by including year-specific dummies, institutional variables and clustered errors.  
Delay in Implementing Re-municipalization Decisions 
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In addition to analyzing the probability of implementation, we also examine the average delay of 
implemented decisions. For this stage of the analysis we restrict our sample to re-
municipalization decisions actually implemented and estimate a model explaining the time lapse 
between the decision and the implementation. Our results for the negative binomial regressions 
for such models are displayed in table 4.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4. Negative binomial regression estimates on the delay of implementation.  
 Logit 
Full Sample 
(10) 
 
Logit 
Full Sample 
(11) 
 
Logit 
Full Sample 
(12) 
 
Logit 
Full Sample 
(13) 
 
Logit 
Full Sample 
(14) 
 
Logit 
Full Sample 
 (15) 
Logit 
Full Sample 
(16) 
Logit 
Full Sample 
 (17) 
 Population -0.0001* 
(0.0000) 
-0.0001* 
(0.0001) 
-0.0001** 
(-0.0001) 
-0.0001* 
(0.0000) 
-0.0001* 
(0.0000) 
-0.0001* 
(0.0000) 
-0.0001* 
(0.0000) 
-0.0001** 
(0.0000) 
Local administration  0.0696 
(0.1227) 
0.0431 
(0.1082) 
0.0376 
(0.1161) 
0.0366 
(0.1063) 
0.0474 
(0.1047) 
0.0628 
(0.1023) 
0.0628 
(0.0431) 
0.0628 
(0.0707) 
Sector (vs. Energy)         
Education -0.5970*** 
(0.2229) 
- - - - - - - 
Health -1.134*** 
(0.3102) 
- - - - - - - 
Other services -0.9160*** 
(0.2100) 
- - - - - - - 
Transportation -0.7310 
(0.5251) 
- - - - - - - 
Waste -0.6637*** 
(0.2186) 
- - - - - - - 
Water -0.5702** 
(0.2456) 
- - - - - - - 
Service characteristics         
Network (vs no network) - 0.6235*** 
(0.1207) 
- 0.6272*** 
(0.1113) 
0.5999*** 
(0.1312) 
0.5218*** 
(0.1386) 
0.5218*** 
(0.1327) 
0.5218*** 
(0.1600) 
Personal (vs technical) - - -0.5011*** 
(0.1661) 
- - - - - 
Private_led (vs. Public_led) -0.7460*** 
(0.2513) 
-0.8395*** 
(0.2542) 
-0.9048*** 
(0.2422) 
- - - - - 
How (vs. Expire)         
Private_led - -  -0.8937*** 
(0.2542) 
-0.9389*** 
(0.2392) 
-0.9922*** 
(0.2548) 
-0.9922*** 
(0.1716) 
-0.9922*** 
(0.1682) 
Deprivatisation 
 
- - - 0.2802 
(0.2719) 
0.4549 
(0.3090) 
0.4217* 
(0.2440) 
0.4217 
(0.3356) 
0.4217* 
(0.2410) 
Terminated - -  -0.7730*** 
(0.2465) 
-0.8536*** 
(0.2242) 
-0.8291*** 
(0.2270) 
-0.8291*** 
(0.3043) 
-0.8291*** 
(0.2373) 
Post great recession -0.3091 
(0.2064) 
-0.3409 
(0.2224) 
-0.1119 
(0.2290) 
-0.3784* 
(0.2054) 
-0.3528* 
(0.2047) 
- - - 
Frequent Countries          
Germany -0.0446 
(0.2023) 
0.2858* 
(0.1600) 
0.4381** 
(0.1752) 
0.1703 
(0.1740) 
- - - - 
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France 0.7050** 
(0.3290) 
0.7396*** 
(0.2218) 
0.7130*** 
(0.2430) 
0.6039*** 
(0.2115) 
- - - - 
UK 0.2633 
(0.2832) 
0.5270** 
(0.2460) 
0.5491** 
(0.2557) 
0.5927** 
(0.2394) 
- - - - 
United States 0.1513 
(0.6145) 
0.4406 
(0.6325) 
0.7332 
(0.6095) 
0.4646 
(0.5724) 
- - - - 
Institutional variables         
Gov_effective - - - - 0.2845 
(0.1862) 
0.1376 
(0.2005) 
0.1376 
(0.1888) 
0.1376 
(0.1847) 
Regulation - - - - 0.5406*** 
(0.1564) 
-0.1332 
(0.2885) 
-0.1332 
(0.1661) 
-0.1332 
(0.1946) 
Legor_uk - - - - 0.4253 
(0.2747) 
0.2881 
(0.2471) 
0.2881* 
(0.1501) 
0.2881* 
(0.1723) 
Legor_fra - - - - 0.1556 
(0.1556) 
0.7026*** 
(0.2701) 
0.7026*** 
(0.2016) 
0.7026*** 
(0.1624) 
Legor_sc - - - - -0.0613 
(0.3301) 
-0.4636 
(0.3263) 
-0.4636** 
(0.2015) 
-0.4636* 
(0.2763) 
Year Dummies No No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Clustered errors (by 
country) 
No No No No No No 
 
Yes No 
Clustered errors (by sector) No No No No No No No Yes 
N. observations 339 339 339 339 338 338 338 338 
Pseudo R2 0.07 0.07 0.05 0.08 0.09 0.11 0.11 0.11 
Wald Chi2 79.48*** 62.09*** 60.75*** 87.16*** 97.78*** - - - 
Log-likelihood -468.01 -473.33 -474.51 -462.50 -456.94 -443.93 -443.93 -443.93 
Notes: Significance levels 1%, 5% and 10% denoted by ***, ** and *, respectively. In parentheses standard errors, 
which are robust to heteroscedasticity in Models 10-15. Parentheses in Models 16-17 display standard errors 
clustered by country and by economic sector, respectively. 
 
We run a number of models that reproduce the presentation of results in table 3. Some of our 
results appear consistent across different models. For instance, we consistently find that 
population size is negatively related to implementation delay.8 This suggests that governments of 
larger municipalities or regions have more capacity to undertake reforms and take over the 
service compared to governments of smaller jurisdictions. We also consistently find that whether 
the administration is local or supra-municipal does not change the results in terms of average 
delay. 
Our analysis provides noteworthy results with regard to the economic sectors in which services 
are located. In Model (10) we find that, compared to energy (the reference category), several 
services are more efficient in terms of average delay. With the exception of transportation all 
other sectors display negative and statistically significant coefficients indicating that decisions to 
re-municipalize are more efficiently implemented (in terms of time) compared to decisions that 
are fully implemented in the energy sector. In order to test H1 and H2 we replace sector 
dummies with the variables ‘network’ and ‘personal’, respectively. H1 is confirmed in Model (11), 
given that the average re-municipalization in the network sectors (where transaction costs are 
higher) takes more time. We also find support for H2 in model (12), as re-municipalization of 
personal oriented services (for example, health, personal and other local government sectors) are 
finalized faster than other services. Unlike table 3, we keep the ‘network’ variable instead of the 
                                                          
8 We do not include the square of the population variable in this model as the fit is better when population alone is 
included. 
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‘personal’ variable in order to test the remaining hypotheses as this improves the fit of our 
models while avoiding multicollinearity. 
The channel through which the re-municipalization decision was taken is also found to be a 
significant determinant of delays in implementation. Our variable distinguishing privately-led 
from publicly-led decisions reports negative and statistically significant coefficients consistently 
across all models in which it is considered either by comparing it to all other public-led decisions 
in Models (10-12) or with respect to contract expire decisions in Models (13-17). These estimates 
indicate that time lags are shorter when the decision to re-municipalize is prompted by the 
private sector selling shares or withdrawing from the service (Models 10-12). In these cases, 
government must take action sooner to return the service to public production. Therefore, even 
if the origin of the decision is not relevant for implementation rates (table 3) publicly led 
decisions are associated with delays in implementation.  
As we find differences in the delay explained by the origin of the decision (privately-led versus. 
publicly-led) we examined these differences more deeply by distinguishing between de-
privatizations, contract expirations and terminated contracts which are within the publicly-led 
group. It is reasonable to expect privately-led and terminated contracts to be negatively related to 
delays, given that the termination of a contract urges the substitution of the private operator. 
Results for this analysis is presented in models (13-17) where the reference category is ‘contract 
expired’. Our findings suggest that, as expected, privately-led and terminated contracts (publicly-
led) are statistically significant and report a negative coefficient. On the contrary, de-privatization 
– which is a decision taken to re-municipalize without any specific target and method- does not 
display consistent results. For some models it is not statistically significant – and therefore is not 
different from ‘contract expire’ – except for two of our preferred models such as model (15), 
which includes time dummies and model (17) where we further consider clustered errors by 
economic sector. Our results show that this diffuse category seems to take more time (positive 
coefficient) to finalize compared to decisions to re-municipalize that are taken after contract 
expiration. Thus, we find some evidence supporting H3 concerning policy ambiguity. 
Again, we find that the coefficient for the ‘post-great recession’ binary variable to be a negative 
and statistically significant but only in models (13 and 14). Re-municipalization decisions were 
not only more frequent after the great recession as described in our descriptive analysis, but 
these decisions were also more likely to be implemented compared to the pre-recession period 
(see table 3). In addition, our results show that (with less consistency however), that the lags 
between taking the decision and finalizing implementation may have been shorter in the post-
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recession period. This provides somewhat weak support for H5 with respect to our analysis of 
the implementation period. The replacement of this variable by the year-specific dummies does 
not clarify the situation. Many coefficients are not statistically significant, and it is not possible to 
find a pattern in relation to time. Thus, we do not find support for the policy learning hypothesis 
(H6) concerning the delay in implementation. 
Country dummies included in Models (10-13) provide some evidence of variation in 
implementation periods across countries although results vary across models. Compared to the 
reference category ‘average period for other countries’, France is found to have longer 
implementation periods in all models considered. Germany, in models (11 and 12) and UK in 
models (11-13) also display similar behavior but with less consistency across models. Finally, the 
US does not seem to behave differently from the reference category. In order to examine 
differences between countries more deeply we replace these dummies with institutional variables. 
We find them to be significant determinants of average delays in Models (14-17). For instance, 
we find that the regulatory burden is positively related to delays in model (14). This suggests that 
more regulation usually complicates the implementation of a decision and this may extend the 
period between the decision and completion of the reversal. However, this result is not produced 
when we replace the ‘post great recession structural change’ variable with year-specific dummies. 
Thus, our results on the importance of the regulatory burden appear weak according to our best 
empirical models.  
Moreover, the ‘government effectiveness’ variable does not appear statistically significant in any 
of the models considered. On the contrary, different legal origins are found to be good 
predictors of implementation delays in addition to implementation rates (table 3). Using the 
German origin as reference category, we again find that the administrations under the British, 
French and Scandinavian legal origins tend to spend more time implementing re-
municipalization decisions compared to jurisdictions where the German legal system applies. 
These results are consistent for our preferred models with time dummies and clustered errors. 
Thus, the German legal origin is associated with higher rates of implementation and these 
implementations appear to be more efficient in terms of delays. All in all, our results provide 
support for the hypothesis that institutions are important although our variables for government 
effectiveness and regulatory burdens do not show much explanatory power.  
Discussion and Conclusions 
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In recent years, there has been growing evidence of a reversal of the earlier international trend 
towards privatization, especially at the level of municipal services. When viewed in historical 
terms it appears that the new wave of re-municipalization represents another swing in the 
regulatory pendulum of public service provision that has oscillated between a public sector and 
privatist paradigms since the mid-nineteenth century (Hall et al, 2013:193). 
As the incidence of re-municipalization increases we can expect several questions to be asked 
about different aspects of a reform that represents a significant re-configuration of public service 
delivery and which appears to have taken hold on a global level. This paper takes advantage of 
the first international dataset that provides information on re-municipalization (i.e. reverse 
privatization at the local government level). It uses the data to empirically examine two principal 
questions. First it examines the factors that determine whether the decision to re-municipalize 
services is effectively implemented (finalized). Second, as the raw data indicates that over 40 per 
cent of decisions have yet to be implemented we analyze the factors that determine the lag 
between the decision to re-municipalize and actual implementation. 
Our findings provide strong empirical support for hypotheses drawn from public versus private 
choice literature. Service characteristics matter in terms of policy implementation and execution. 
Sectors such as water and waste services which possess strong network characteristics are 
associated with lower probabilities of implementation. Also, it takes longer to implement re-
municipalization policies in network sectors. On the other hand, re-municipalization is more 
likely to be implemented in personal services including health and education. Moreover, re-
municipalization is finalized faster for these services. 
Support for hypotheses drawn from policy implementation literature is more nuanced. The 
results do not find that greater clarity about re-municipalization policy is associated with the level 
of implementation. But there is some support for the proposition that less ambiguity is 
associated with lower delays in implementation. There is some support for the hypothesis that 
the quality of government is positively associated with the probability of implementing policy but 
not the time taken to complete the task. However, other institutional factors such as legal 
traditions are found to be significant determinants of policy implementation and its finalization. 
Specifically, countries following the German legal tradition are associated with higher 
probabilities of implementing and completing reforms compared to other legal traditions. The 
level of regulatory burden also has a degree of impact and there is some support for the 
hypotheses that higher burdens are negatively associated with implementation and reforms take 
longer to complete in jurisdictions where burdens are greater. 
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External economic conditions, specifically the great recession, are found to have increased the 
probability of implementing reforms and there is some evidence of faster implementation in the 
post-recession period. However, we fail to find evidence that policy implementation is more 
efficient over time. Although the level of policy implementation increases over time the speed of 
implementation does not improve. This result indicates that policy learning is not evident but 
this may be attributable to the fact that re-municipalization is a relatively recent development. 
Overall, when our analysis of the re-municipalization phenomenon is considered in terms of 
relevant theoretical frameworks we find support for propositions from theory that considers 
choices between public and private sector delivery of services. However, support for 
propositions derived from the literature on the implementation of public policy measures in 
more limited. 
Our analysis also produces noteworthy results in relation to other aspects of re-municipalization 
policy. We find that when reform is prompted by the private sector withdrawing from service 
provision or selling shares, the change is implemented with less delay compared to publicly led 
change in situations such as when contracts to expire. Similarly, implementation is more quickly 
finalized when the decision is taken to terminate contracts. 
Overall, our analysis makes an original contribution to the literature on public service delivery by 
conducting the first empirical analysis of re-municipalization of which the authors are aware. The 
scale of re-municipalization revealed by the data we use shows that the push to reverse earlier 
privatizations and to restore government control of public services has gathered momentum and 
is extending its reach in international terms. It remains to be seen if this trend will continue but 
the scale of re-municipalization to date is an important phenomenon and this study goes some 
way towards illuminating the factors associated with its full implementation and the time-
efficiency of its finalization. 
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